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Abstract
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed the idea of the Belt and Road Initiative, 
which aims, at no less than a revolution, changing the world’s economic map. It is also seen by 
many as the first shot in a battle between east and west for dominance in Eurasia. In this paper, 
we emphasize the importance of the Strait of Malacca in the Belt and Road Initiative, and this 
importance was analyzed by neo-liberalism. We take the traditional Malacca Dilemma as an 
example of the fact that even the Belt and Road Initiative is an attempt to change China’s energy 
strategy. First, the Middle East is involved in the majority of international anti-terrorism, and the 
conflicts had broken out what are bad for this type of initiative, meanwhile, this will probably 
lead to a decrease in the Middle East’s energy output. In this part, I am trying my best to explain 
that China will have to import more energy than before from other parts of the world, which 
means it will be impossible for China to get rid of the Strait of Malacca. On the other hand, China 
is enhancing its cooperation with ASEAN, which has been proven to have a lot of natural gas 
reserves, allowing China to adjust or optimise its energy structure. Due to the reasons given 
above, by using of neo-liberalism, this paper focuses on proving that the proposition of the Belt 
and Road Initiative makes the Strait of Malacca more and more important.
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1. Introduction
Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed the idea of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. 
As part of the financing of the plan, in 2014, the Chinese leader also announced the launch of 
an Asian International Infrastructure Bank (AIIB),1 providing 47 billion dollars in seed funding 
for the project. China is building the world’s greatest economic construction and development 
project ever undertaken: the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims at no less than a revolutionary 
change in the economic map of the world.2 It is also seen by many as the first shot in a battle 
between east and west for dominance in Eurasia. The ambitious vision aims to resurrect the 
ancient Silk Road as a modern transit, trade, and economic corridor from Shanghai to Berlin. 
The ‘Road’ will traverse China, Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Germany, extending more 
than 8,000 miles, creating an economic zone that extends over one third of the circumference of 
the earth. 
Meanwhile, the other part of the Belt and Road Initiative is the 21st-Century Maritime 
Silk Road, which also significant for Chinese and the world’s economic development. Such 
an initiative draws inspiration both from history and from the latest developments in the 21st 
century. The aim is to inject a strong impetus for enhancing political mutual trust, deepening 
economic cooperation, and promoting cultural as well as people-to-people exchanges among 
relevant countries through joint cooperation, common development, and regional integration. 
All countries along the Maritime Silk Road are welcome to plan, develop, and benefit from the 
initiative.3 
On the afternoon of November 22, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited to the Strait 
of Malacca by car after wrapping up his attendance at the series of leaders’ meetings about East 
Asian cooperation. This started his official visit to Malaysia.4 The historical channel and the busy 
nature of modern shipping indicate that the peaceful and friendly cooperation between China and 
Malaysia will certainly continue into the future. On the other hand, it also proves that the Chinese 
government attaches importance to Malacca due to concerns about the energy security of China. 
2. Theoretical Framework
In this paper, we emphasize the importance of the Strait of Malacca in the Belt and Road 
Initiative, and this importance was analyzed by neo-liberalism. Because neoliberals are optimistic 
on the international cooperation and they believe that changes in preferences over strategies 
usually are sufficient to produce mutual benefit. Much of this change can come by more and 
better information-information about the situation, information about what the other side has 
done and why it has done it, and information about what the other side is likely to do in the 
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future. States can cooperate by reducing transaction costs (the costs and risks associated with 
reaching and carrying out agreements) and, in turn, the successful reduction of such costs can 
facilitate cooperation. 
Then we take the traditional Malacca Dilemma as an example of the fact that even the Belt 
and Road Initiative is an attempt to change China’s energy strategy but that it will be hard to 
achieve the expected targets. First, the Middle East is involved in the majority of international 
anti-terrorism, and the conflicts that have broken out are bad for this type of initiative. 
Meanwhile, this will probably lead to a decrease in the Middle East’s energy output. Because 
of this, China will have to import more energy than before from other parts of the world, which 
means it will be impossible for China to get rid of the importance of the Strait of Malacca. On the 
other hand, China is enhancing its cooperation with ASEAN, which has been proven to have a lot 
of natural gas reserves, which will allow China to adjust its energy structure. Due to the reasons 
given above, this paper focuses on proving that the proposition of the Belt and Road Initiative 
makes the Strait of Malacca more and more important. 
Keohane and Nye in the book of Power and Interdependence described, “Interdependence is 
an objective existence”, Keohane and Nye pointed out that in the world political interdependence 
refers to the mutual influence among countries or behavior.5 Interdependence depends on 
strong mutual influence and mutual connection. First of all, interdependence does not mean 
the consistency of interests. Second, the state of interdependence provides the possibility for 
cooperation; however, interdependence does not means it will lead to cooperation. Whether it 
is able to reach the cooperation depends on the factors of the game results. Finally, cooperation 
should not be viewed as an international state without conflicts, what should be thought as a 
response to conflict or potential conflict. Mutual dependence is the source of cooperation, with 
the deepening of mutual dependence, the cooperation among countries is easy to achieve, in 
other words, it can be said that interdependence provides possibility and opportunities for 
cooperation.
The book’s author of After Hegemony, Robert Keohane, and Thomas Crombie Schelling, 
an international relations scholars, they take use of the game theory, psychology, sociology and 
other disciplines to analyze the phenomenon of international conflicts. The model of prisoners’ 
dilemma is the most famous for explaining the international cooperation. In prisoners’ dilemma, 
two actors are expected to be in the best position, but in the two sides cannot communicate 
the premise, to the other side of the cooperation do not cooperate as the best strategy. The 
uncertainty of the premise, the behavior of the body may choose to cooperate may also choose to 
betray. The model shows that cooperation can be used as one of the options.
Robert Axelord written in his book, The Evolution of Cooperation, by using game theory to 
explain the cooperative problem, he used a computer program were repetitive calculations. The 
results showed that when the game chain extending, it leads that the behavior of the parties to 
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the game converging, what means that in complex game, actors will gradually choose cooperative 
strategy.6 The strategy of “TIT FOR TAT” can explain the prisoner's dilemma.7 Then the 
conditions of cooperation in the process of the game: 1) actors should have enough opportunities 
to interact with each other 2) actors in the interaction can clearly recognize the common interests 
that adopt the strategy of mutual benefits 3) to understand and trust each other 4) actors of 
betrayal will bear the cost of the corresponding price - the law. Thus it can be said that the game 
provides a choice for cooperation.
Keohane believes that the international mechanism has three forms: international 
institutions, international intergovernmental organizations, and international conventions.8 
International system is one form of the mechanism, it promotes cooperation following several 
aspects: 1) International system by improving information supply and violators shall bear legal 
liability, reduce transaction cost of behavior body and uncertainty behaviors, such as, the ways 
to attract actors to participate in the cooperation 2) International system behavior redefine 
the interests of the state and change the behavior of the body preferences. 3) International 
institutions to the internalization of externalities, to build a mutually beneficial model. The 
international mechanism refers to a series of implicit explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures that are formed by a set of established international relations 
that are gathered around the behavior of the actors. Because the difficulties and costs of the 
international mechanism, the rational behavior of the body to adjust the existing mechanism as 
much as possible.
3. The Outline of The Straits of Malacca from the viewpoint of energy security
3.1 The Strait of Malacca
The Strait of Malacca is a narrow, 805 km (500 mi) stretch of water between the Malay 
Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The Strait of Malacca is one of the most 
important shipping lanes in the world despite being only 2.8 km wide. This strait is the main 
shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, linking major Asian 
economies such as India, China, Japan, and South Korea. Over 60,000 vessels pass through the 
strait each year, carrying about one-fourth of the world’s traded goods,9 including oil, Chinese 
manufactured products, and products from other countries. About a quarter of all oil carried by 
sea passes through the Strait, mainly from Persian Gulf suppliers to Asian markets. In 2007, an 
estimated 13.7 million barrels per day were transported through the strait, which increased to 
an estimated 15.2 million barrels per day in 2011.10 In addition, it is also one of the world’s most 
congested shipping choke points. 
However, geopolitically, the Strait of Malacca fall under a number of different territorial and 
maritime jurisdictions. Primarily, the Straits are defined as falling between Peninsular Malaysia 
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(with a small portion of southern Thailand) and the island of Sumatra with its east and west 
limits bordering Singaporean and Indian (the Andaman and Nicobar Island chain) territorial 
waters. The International Hydrographic Organization, a non-governmental body in charge of 
documenting hydrographic and maritime limitations, has defined the Strait of Malacca as the 
following: 
•	 On the west: From the northernmost point of Sumatra (Pedropunt) and Lem Voalan on the 
southern extremity of Phuket Island, Thailand; 
•	 On the east: From Tanjong Piai on the Malaysian Peninsula and Klein Karimoen, Indonesia; 
•	 On the north: The southwestern coast of the Malay Peninsula; 
•	 On the south: The northwestern coast of Sumatra to the eastward city of Tanjung Kedabu 
to Klein Karimoen, Indonesia.11 
3.2. The Situation of Chinese Energy12
The Middle East, as the largest oil-producing region in the world, supplies the demand for 
oil all over the world, and now the proportion is more than 40%.13 Meanwhile, the storage capacity 
of natural gas in the Middle East is 5,682 million cubic meters, and with the development of the 
world’s industry, more and more countries are realizing that natural gas is a cleaner form of 
energy. For China, it is the same as the rest of the world, with the importing of oil and natural at 
66% and 86%.14
China is now the second largest energy user in the world. It depends on the Malacca Strait 
for 85% of its imports,
 
including 80% of its energy imports.15
 
Beijing has primarily provided 
financial assistance to the littoral countries. In 2012, the Chinese government announced China’s 
Energy Policy 2012, which aimed to deepen and reform the country’s energy structure and 
transform its developmental pattern, giving prominence to the building of resources that will 
lead to an environmentally friendly society.16 In this file, the government introduced clear targets 
and briefly analyzed the current situation. On the other hand, the file also showed that China 
faces many challenges in terms of energy, such as the fact that the country’s energy-resource 
endowment is not high enough and that its per-capita shares of coal, petroleum, and natural gas 
are low. It also discussed the Malacca Dilemma, among other issues. 
The construction and development of the Maritime Silk Road have an extremely important 
strategic significance for the economic and cultural exchange between China and the rest of the 
world. Strengthening the oil and gas cooperation between China and ASEAN is an important 
part of the construction and development of the Maritime Silk Road. At the termination of the 
Maritime Silk Road, in the north of Africa, is another important partner for China. As China 
continues to rise, its demand for oil will grow rapidly. In order to ensure its oil security, China has 
to acquire oil from the world because its domestic oil resources are not enough to meet its rapid 
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economic growth. Whatever path toward growth China takes, its huge oil demand will impact the 
world oil market and will influence the existing international oil order and system. As part of its 
energy strategy, China’s enterprises have gone to almost every corner of the world to buy oil or 
make investments in oil fields where there are opportunities, disregarding the potential for huge 
risks in some places. Among the activities of China’s national oil companies, their investments in 
some African countries are very outstanding, and apparently, China’s large imports of oil from 
Africa have attracted the eyes of the world. Thus, the oil ties between China and Africa, based 
mainly on China’s oil purchases and investments, are of increasing interest to many policymakers 
and experts. 
The economic and political intervention from the United States, Japan, and other developed 
countries. The United States and Japan are the major trading partners of the ASEAN countries. 
Based on statistics, the trade among the United States, Japan, and ASEAN has exceeded the 
level of trade between ASEAN and China. In recent years, with the growth of China’s exports to 
ASEAN, a large number of inexpensive consumer goods and mechanical and electrical products 
have entered the ASEAN market. China has become a strong competitor with the ASEAN 
countries and even with other countries in Europe or with America. The close economic and 
trade exchanges offer huge benefits to China, the ASEAN members, and Japan, which has made 
the West feel uneasy. In 2002, the ASEAN Trade Advisory Council of the United States asked 
the U.S. government to take effective and powerful measures to prevent the establishment of 
the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. In addition, it also urged the United States and ASEAN to 
establish a United States-ASEAN free trade area to counter China. At the same time, Japan also 
took various measures to interfere with the cooperation between China and ASEAN, hoping 
to play a central role in promoting the economic integration of East Asia in the future. The 
interference of Japan and the United States in different areas of the China-ASEAN oil and gas 
cooperation had a negative impact.
There still contained some disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea. The South 
China Sea sovereignty dispute originated at the end of 1960s and the beginning of the 70s. 
The catalyst of this dispute was the discovery of China’s offshore oil and gas resources. The 
United Nations formulated a law for the sea, but the terms were imperfect, and the territorial 
demarcation principles were vague. The coveted oil and gas resources in the countries 
surrounding the South China Sea have the potential to cause many problems. At the beginning 
of the 1970s, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other ASEAN countries became involved in rampant 
illegal exploitation of oil in China’s territorial waters, a phenomenon that is ongoing. In 1982, to 
sign the Department in 1994 and the entry into force of the UN Convention on the law of the sea 
also contributed to the phenomenon of the surrounding countries carrying out illegal activities in 
the South China Sea Islands and the reefs, because the Convention “owns the island you can have 
in a certain sea area resources” provisions. The United Nations’ Convention on the law of the sea 
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asked the state party to submit its own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in May 
2009. It said that the Commission will be based on the state’s proposal to deal with the territorial 
dispute. After the announcement, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other countries ignored the nine 
segment lines within the area due to the fact that the Chinese territory, in the delimitation that 
the Commission submitted on the occupation of Chinese territory, was not recognized. China 
and the Philippines, Vietnam in twenty-first Century years ago in the South China Sea oil and gas 
cooperation, although there is a certain progress, but so far there is no big breakthrough, the 
main factors should be the main factor on the sovereignty dispute.
4. Facts and Trends of Chinese Energy Security
In accordance with the situation of China’s energy, some researchers have focused on 
elaborating countermeasures to solve the energy security problem. However, if researchers only 
identify the questions without searching for the reasons, it will lead us to fall. Many people have 
said that the best method to solve the energy security problem is to deepen energy innovation, 
heighten energy use efficiency, attend to the international energy stock, and build up a steady 
international oil supply. These are the necessary conditions for safeguarding energy security, 
according to researchers. Every country should develop ways of transporting oil, strengthening 
the ability to control energy transportation, and meanwhile, quickening the oil reser ve 
construction; these are some of the important methods that can be used to ensure oil security. 
Cooperation among countries by means of conferences, built to enhance military defense and to 
protect countries’ overseas interests, is also a necessary measure to ensure the nation’s energy 
safety, in which multiply energy structures will be the ultimate solution to energy safety. Finally, 
multilateral security cooperation is necessary for the East Asian countries.17
	 6
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Figure 1: China’s Total Coal Consumption18
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Even if all these measures are put into practice, it will not change the fact that the demand 
for energy is plentiful. Let us take coal as an example. In 2011, China used 3.8 billion tons of 
coal; this number represents almost half the world’s coal consumption. In accordance with 
Coal’s Dominance in China’s Power Generation, coal makes up about two thirds of the fuel 
used for power generation in China. According to Chinese estimates, the share of coal in power 
generation in 2012 may be as high as 75% to 77%. The volume of coal used in the generation of 
power is likely to remain the same in the future; China will account for a great part of the world’s 
coal consumption. 
However, the consequences and costs of such a production-intensive and coal-reliant 
economy are dramatic and stark. Pollutants from coal-fired plants, whether sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
or PM 2.5, are choking urban China. Repeated occurrences of “airpocalypse” have become 
emblematic of the considerable downsides of a coal- based economy.19 More than a decade into 
China’s industrialization, the environmental and potential public health costs are no longer an 
abstraction but a grim reality, and these problems are becoming a social problem. 
In the past decade, China has increased its energy production and has expanded its 
production of renewable and nuclear energy. The National Bureau of Statistics reported that the 
use of hydro, wind, solar, and nuclear power increased to 9.5 percent of total energy use in 2008. 
Meanwhile, some reports indicate that plans are underway to increase the share of renewable 
energy to 15 percent by 2020.20 Hydropower increased from one percent of China’s total energy 
consumption in 1949 to 7.4 percent in 2008; in that year, China’s hydropower capacity had 
reached 170 million kw, making China the largest hydropower-consuming country in the world. 
China’s wind-energy production has doubled every year in the past three years; its current 
capacity of 12.21 million kw ranks the fourth in the world.21 In 2008, the solar energy sector 
produced about 6,000 tons of polycrystalline silicon and 2 million kw of solar photovoltaic cells, 
while the nuclear power sector’s installed capacity was 8.85 million kw.22
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Figure 2: China’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1965-2009 (million tons)23 
 
When we read these reports, we gain a very strong impression of China’s energy 
use and production. However, there still many problems. We will focus on an analysis 
of China’s oil use. Based on the graph above (China’s Oil Production and 
Consumption, 1965-2009, (million tons)), we found that the country’s oil 
consumption in 2009 was more than 400 million tons.  
 
Crude oil import from 1990 1997 2005 2006 2008 2010 
Middle East 39% 48% 46% 44% 46% 46% 
Russia/Central Asia n/a n/a 11% 11% 10% 10% 
Atlantic Basin n/a n/a 23% 5% 3% 3% 
Asia Pacific 60% 26.2% 8% 4% n/a n/a 
Africa 0% 16.7% n/a 32% 23% 22% 
Others 0% 9.6% 12% 4% 18% 19% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 1: China’s Crude Oil Imports by Origin24 (% share) 
China’s demand for imported oil has changed in accordance with the global and 
regional geopolitical and economic developments over time and in response to 
geopolitical and transportation risks. Nevertheless, Middle Eastern countries have 
always acted as the most important suppliers of about half of China’s imported oil. 
Based on the calculations of the tables, China’s Crude Oil Import by Source (Figure 3) 
and China’s Crude Oil Imports by Origin (Table 2), it is easy to support this 
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When we read these reports, we gain a very strong impression of China’s energy use and 
production. However, there still many problems. We will focus on an analysis of China’s oil use. 
Based on the graph above (China’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1965-2009, (million tons)), 
we found that the country’s oil consumption in 2009 was more than 400 million tons. 
Table 1: China’s Crude Oil Imports by Origin24 (% share)
Crude oil import from 1990 1997 2005 2006 2008 2010
Middle East 39% 48% 46% 44% 46% 46%
Russia/Central Asia n/a n/a 11% 11% 10% 10%
Atlantic Basin n/a n/a 23% 5% 3% 3%
Asia Pacific 60% 26.2% 8% 4% n/a n/a
Africa 0% 16.7% n/a 32% 23% 22%
Others 0% 9.6% 12% 4% 18% 19
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
China’s demand for impor ted oil has changed in accordance with the global and 
regional geopolitical and economic developments over time and in response to geopolitical 
and transportation risks. Nevertheless, Middle Eastern countries have always acted as the 
most important suppliers of about half of China’s imported oil. Based on the calculations 
China’s Crude Oil Imports by Origin (Table 1), it is easy to support this conclusion. China has 
been trying to import crude oil from other parts of the world to decrease its dependence on 
imports from the volatile Middle East. This includes its investments in African countries such 
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as Angola, Sudan, Libya, and the Congo, and in Russian and Central Asian countries such as 
Kazakhstan. Investments in these Central Asian countries can also significantly decrease sea-lane 
transportation risks. The financial crisis has not changed China’s source of oil imports.
Even China had taken some measures to multiply its oil sources and to decrease its 
dependence on oil imports from the Middle East; no one can deny that the Middle East is 
the energy center of the world and still produces large proportions of the energy share. This 
situation will lasts for a long time, not for only China but for other countries in the world. Oil is an 
important energy for industry and even for people’s daily lives. During this period, Middle East 
will continue to play an important role in the global community.
Finally, let us pay attention to natural gas, which is thought to take the place of oil, because 
its clear. In China, a similar policy is spreading related to the air-pollution of PM 2.5. 
Natural gas will be of crucial importance to this narration in the future. There is increasing 
market consensus that Chinese natural gas demands will balloon over the next decade, which has 
led some to go so far as to proclaim that the era of coal is yielding to a golden age of gas in China. 
There are indeed strong reasons for optimism that gas will get a significant boost in China’s 
energy mix, not least of which is the strong political support the idea receives.
Natural gas is not carbon-free by any means, but it is cleaner than burning coal and oil. It is, 
therefore, viewed as an important factor in reducing air pollution and emissions and as a “bridge 
fuel” in China’s transition to cleaner energy.
The potential for natural gas growth is enormous in China since it is today only about 4 to 
5 percent of China’s energy mix, which is far lower than the world average of around 20 percent. 
By 2015, China anticipates doubling natural gas so that it represents 8% to 9% percent of its 
energy mix or between 230-260 bcm of gas consumption in total volume.25 While estimates vary 
about the total demand figures, virtually all projections anticipate rapid growth. According to the 
BP Energy Outlook, China will contribute 23 percent of the increase in global gas demand and 
is expected to reach the European Union’s 2010 gas consumption level by 2030.26 As shown in 
the table below, China, while starting from a low base, will have by far the biggest share of gas 
demand growth over the next decade.
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Figure 3: Natural Gas Demand in Select Regions in the New Policies Scenario27 
 
    Chinese domestic production, however, is unlikely to keep up with this robust 
demand growth, which has expanded by nearly 20% since 2010. China has imported 
about one-third every year, and this is a trend that is unlikely to abate in the near term. 
While it was initially thought that China’s vast domestic reserves of unconventional 
resources such as shale gas could fill the gap between supply and demand, the role of 
shale is likely to disappoint in the medium term. 
    Urbanization, the centerpiece of China’s growth strategy through at least 2020, 
will also support natural gas because urban residential demand has been a major 
driver of gas consumption (e.g., Chinese households almost exclusively cook with gas 
stoves). Between 2005 and 2012, residential gas consumption ballooned by 260%, 
thereby outpacing the consumption growth rate in the industry. This trend is likely to 
pick up for the residential sector on the back of urbanization and as industrial growth 
slows down. Expected natural gas demand for the power sector should also see 
significant growth, although, in absolute terms, the amount of gas in the generation of 
power will still represent only a fraction compared to that of coal.  
The central aim of Chinese foreign policy continues to be the maintenance of a 
stable international system. China may be competing for energy resources with other 
countries, but this competition is unlikely to lead to direct confrontation. Similarly, 
energy security concerns have not led the PRC to drastically increase its defense 
expenditure. Economic factors triggered by China’s capitalist transition will continue 
to deepen the country’s energy-import dependence, thereby increasing the prominence 
of energy security in Chinese policy-making. The successful protection of energy 
security will, in turn, depend, in large part, on whether China can manage its 
geopolitical environment and avoid confrontation over energy resources. It will also 
hinge on whether China’s energy production and distribution system can be reformed 
to avoid ecological degradation and disaster. 
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Chinese domestic production, however, is unlikely to keep up with this robust demand 
growth, which has expanded by nearly 20% since 2010. China has imported about one-third every 
year, and this is a trend that is unlikely to abate in the near term. While it was initially thought 
that China’s vast domestic reserves of unconventional resources such as shale gas could fill the 
gap between supply and demand, the role of shale is likely to disappoint in the medium term.
Urbanization, the centerpiece of China’s growth strategy through at least 2020, will 
also support natural gas because urban re idential demand has been a major driver of gas 
consum tion (e.g., Chinese households almost xclusively cook with g s stov s). Between 2005 
and 2012, residential gas consumption ballooned by 260%, hereby outpacing the consumption 
growth rate in the industry. This t nd is likely to pick up for the residential sector on the back 
of urbanization and as industrial growth slows down. Expected natural gas demand for the power 
sect r s ould also see significant growth, although, i  absolute term , the amount of gas in the 
generation of ow r will still repre ent only a fraction compar d to that of coal. 
The central aim of Chinese foreign policy contin es to be the mainte ance of a stable 
international system. China may be competing for energy resources with other countries, but 
this competition is unlikely to lead to direct confrontation. Similarly, energy security concerns 
have not led the PRC to drastically increase its defense expenditure. Economic factors triggered 
by China’s capitalist transition will continue to deepen the country’s energy-import dependence, 
thereby increasing the prominence of energy security in Chinese policy-making. The successful 
protection of energy security will, in turn, depend, in large part, on whether China can manage 
its geopolitical environment and avoid confrontation over energy resources. It will also hinge on 
whether China’s energy production and distribution system can be reformed to avoid ecological 
degradation and disaster.
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5. The Belt and Road initiative and energy strategy
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia in the autumn 
of 2013, he proposed a Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21st century Maritime Silk Road. Since 
then, the so-called “One Belt, One Road” initiative has been a controversial issue. At a summit of 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in November 2014, President Xi demonstrated his 
strong will to promote the initiative.
Of the Belt and Road initiative, the Eurasian Corridor or Land Bridge portion will cover 
the enhancement of infrastructure, including expressways, railways, pipelines, and optical fiber 
cables. The Silk Road Economic Belt plan is a grand strategic initiative that seeks to develop 
a new trade and transportation route linking China with Central Asia and Europe. There are 
various candidates for the route. The three basic candidates are given in the map. 
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The Chinese government believes that the “One Belt, One Road” initiative is of great 
significance to its energy security strategy. Energy security is vital to industrialization and 
economic development. The international situation indicates that the U.S. “return to Asia” 
strategy has increased the risk of blockade in relation to the Malacca Strait and the South China 
Sea, which are both key points for China on the energy transportation route. In preparation for 
such a blockade, China has apparently been attempting to promote the so-called “March West” 
strategy for developing ground transportation routes in response to the U.S. Asian strategy.
The government consistently maintains a strategic recognition that security must have two 
components. The “One Belt, One Road” strategy has domestic and overseas components. The 
overseas component covers the diversification of import sources, import routes, and energy 
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sources. East European countries that depend on Russia for 100% of their natural gas supply are 
fatally vulnerable to political supply disruptions. China may be moving strategically to avoid such 
vulnerability.
In addition to a crude oil pipeline built between China and Kazakhstan, China completed 
three pipelines—A, B, and C—from Turkmenistan in Central Asia to China’s west-east natural 
gas pipeline via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in December 2009, October 2010, and May 2014, 
respectively. Their designed annual supply capacity is 55 million cubic meters each. China started 
the construction of the fourth or D natural gas pipeline in September 2014. When it is completed 
in 2020, the four pipelines’ combined annual capacity will reach 85 billion cubic meters. China 
also plans to construct a pipeline linking China to Iran via Pakistan and Afghanistan. If this 
pipeline is completed, China’s stable energy supply capacity will increase dramatically.
The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road is that part of the Belt and Road initiative that goes 
over the sea. Historically, the maritime Silk Road refers to the ancient maritime trade and cultural 
route between China and other parts of Asia, Europe, East Africa, and the Middle East. Xi’s 
MSR is an initiative to restore the historical maritime prestige and influence that China once 
wielded as a maritime power. It is the counterpart of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative 
that Xi announced in September 2013, which focuses on overland connectivity between China 
and Central Asia into Europe. The Chinese refer to this pair of initiatives as “One Belt and One 
Road.” At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in late November 2014, 
Xi announced his foreign relations objectives, which included the agenda to “turn China’s 
neighborhood areas into a community of common destiny ... and boost win- win cooperation and 
connectivity with our neighbors.”29
In the context of this plan, these two parts of Silk Road initiatives aim to promote bilateral 
and multilateral partnerships across Asia to consolidate China’s leadership status in the region 
and are linked to China’s continued efforts at national rejuvenation as a comprehensive national 
power.30 However, the National Development and Reform Commission is still drafting the exact 
plans for the two initiatives.31 As a result, while the plan is focused on developing maritime 
connectivity and infrastructure access across Asia, it remains a vague agenda that is thin on 
details.
6.  Energy Cooperation Between China and ASEAN in the 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road from Neo-Liberalism
6.1 Cooperation in Oil
China and ASEAN countries have traded oil and gas with each other for several decades. 
Cooperation between China and ASEAN countries in the field of energy began in the early 1980s. 
The period from the 1980s to the 1990s was a stable developmental stage. From the beginning of 
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the 1990s, the two sides of the oil trade accelerated bilateral energy trade. We collected data and 
found that, during the period 2001-2004, China’s oil imports from ASEAN countries increased 
from $3.1billion to $6.5billion, while the amount of oil exports increased from $1.25billion to 
$2.3billion. 
In 2005, China imported 8 million tons of crude oil and 6 million tons of refined oil from 
ASEAN countries, which took China’s import volume of crude oil and refined oil to 7.5% and 
22%.32 Even today, some changes are taking place in the trade scale and structure, and the China-
ASEAN cooperation and trade in oil and natural gas continues to develop. 
Table 2: China imports Crude Oil form ASEAN33
ASEAN Countries Volume (tons)
Thailand 589010
Vietnam 647080
Indonesia 684407
Brunei 79021
Malaysia 602992
Philippines 68039
In accordance with the data released by the Chinese national customs, in 2013 China 
imported about 2.67 million tons of crude oil from ASEAN countries. Most of this crude oil 
was imported from Indonesia and Vietnam, at about 680 thousand tons and 640 thousand tons, 
respectively; in 2013, China’s total import of crude oil was about 2.8 tons, while the trading 
volume with ASEAN countries took China’s total crude oil volume to about 1%. If we compare 
this with the 2005 figures, the proportion of China’s crude oil imports from ASEAN countries 
declined. In 2013, China also exported crude oil to Malaysia to the figure of about 19 thousand 
tons.
6.2 Cooperation in Natural Gas
Compared with its crude oil imports, China’s natural gas imports from ASEAN countries 
are much higher. ASEAN is one of the most important sources of natural gas for China. In 2006, 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the Malaysia national oil company 
signed a natural gas trade agreement. According to the agreement, Malaysia will provide natural 
gas supply to Shanghai LNG station for 25 years; from 2007, Indonesia annually provided 2.6 
million tons of liquefied natural gas to the Fujian Province; furthermore, in 2013, China imported 
35.3 million tons of natural gas from surrounding countries. Regarding the volume of natural gas, 
Malaysia and Indonesia liquefied natural gas (LNG) account for 2.7 million and 2.4 million tons, 
which is about 14% of the total volume. 
In this process, the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea are two of the most important 
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sea-lanes for the global oil and natural gas trade. According to EIA’s calculations, in 1993, the 
amount of crude oil that comes through the Malacca Strait represents 7 million barrels per 
day, whereas in 2011, the volume was 15 million barrels per day, which was about one third of 
the volume of global crude oil shipments. It represented almost one sixth of the world’s crude 
oil trade. Today, about 1.4 million barrels of crude oil pass through the Strait of Malacca every 
day, and these are processed in Singapore and Malaysia. The rest of the crude oil is transported 
through the South China Sea as channel exports to China, Japan, Korea, and other countries. 
The crude oil is processed in Singapore and Malaysia to be made into refined oil and is then 
transported through the South China Sea and enters the Asian market.34 
In 2011, about 1,700 cubic meters of natural gas or more than 50% of the world’s LNG 
trade was transported through the South China Sea to meet the demand of different countries 
for natural gas. About half of this was transported to Japan, and the rest was transported to 
China, Taiwan, and other regions; about 75% of the LNG was from Qatar, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Australia.35 With the economic development of Asia, the future will see more LNG passing 
through the South China Sea channel to countries in need of natural gas. As energy channels, 
Malacca and the South China Sea are thus particularly important for China and the ASEAN 
countries. If the sea-lane was cut off, it would be a huge shock to the economy and society of 
China and the ASEAN countries. 
6.3 The Opportunities for China-ASEAN cooperation
There is no doubt that the building of the free trade area between China and the ASEAN 
countries will promote and develop the regional economy and enhance cooperation in the 
trade of oil and natural gas. In recent years, China and ASEAN’s bilateral economic trade has 
been in good shape, with an annual average that has increased by more than 20% and the scale 
of trade continuing to grow.36 In 2011, the bilateral investment stood at 94 billion dollars, with 
China’s investment in the ASEAN countries increasing by 34%. With the deepening of economic 
exchange, personnel exchange is also increasing and reach 150 million.37 In the current 
economic situation, the economic development of the developed countries is generally beginning 
to slow down, but the FTA built between China and the ASEAN countries is continuing to grow 
and grow. In fact, the China-ASEAN free trade area is growing much faster than other areas in 
the world. Thus, governments and enterprises attach great importance to opening up markets 
and expanding cooperation. With the establishment of the China-ASEAN FTA, a greater stage is 
provided for bilateral governments to cooperate in oil and natural gas trading, which benefits all 
the countries involved. 
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Table 3: The ASEAN countries’ oil reserves (unit: billion barrels)38
Nations 1993 2003 2012 2013 2013(Reserve and  
production ratio)
Brunei 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 22.3
Indonesia 5.2 4.7 3.7 3.7 11.6
Malaysia 5.0 4.8 3.7 3.7 15.3
Thailand 0.2 0.5 0.4. 0.4 2.5
Vietnam 0.6 3.0 4.4 4.4 34.5
Cambodia 0 - - - -
Burma 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Singapore 0 - - - -
Laos 0 - - - -
Philippines 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 -
Table 4: The ASEAN countries’ oil production (unit: thousand barrels per day)39
Nations 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Brunei 8.3 8.5 8.1 7.8 6.6
Indonesia 48.4 48.6 46.3 44.6 42.7
Malaysia 32.2 32.0 28.9 30.3 29.6
Thailand 14.6 14.8 15.2 16.4 16.6
Vietnam 16.7 15.3 15.5 17.0 17.0
Cambodia 0.6 - - - -
Burma 18.1 20.3 20.0 20.0 20.0
Singapore 0 - - - -
Laos 0 - - - -
Philippines 24.4 32.9 26.6 20.0 21.0
Since the 1990s, the major oil-producing countries of ASEAN have not seen a dramatic 
change in their oil storage: Vietnam’s has increased a little, while Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, 
and Thailand’s are declining. The decline is most obvious in Indonesia, as the ASEAN’s largest 
oil producer. 
Table 5: The ASEAN countries’ oil consumption (unit: thousand barrels per day)40
Nations 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Brunei 15.5 16.3 18.2 18.0 18.0
Indonesia 61.6 66.4 72.3 73.2 73.8
Malaysia 29.2 29.3 31.1 30.7 31.2
Thailand 44.2 44.3 46.6 49.6 50.4
Vietnam 14.6 15.6 17.0 17.2 17.4
Cambodia 36.3 26.3 33.0 43.0 47.5
Burma 26.5 26.7 27.0 27.4 28.1
Singapore 1169 1380 1238 1247 1292
Laos 3.16 3.16 3.0 3.5 3.5
Philippines 295 309 316 302 299
100
The Importance of the Malacca Dilemma in the Belt and Road Initiative
In the last 5 years, the oil consumption of the 10 ASEAN countries has maintained steady 
growth. The main oil-importing countries are Thailand, Philippines, Burma, Singapore, and 
Cambodia. Singapore is the most unique among the 10 ASEAN countries, because the territory is 
smaller than the others and has fewer oil and gas resources; however, Singapore has the world’s 
third largest oil-processing center with the capacity to process 120 barrels of crude oil per day. 
The oil-processing industry holds 11% of its gross industrial output value. Meanwhile, Singapore 
is outstanding in Southeast Asia: not only is it a center of financial trade and shipping, but it also 
has a special position in the operation of energy systems. Because production and consumption 
are slower than before, ASEAN countries have generally realized the importance of improving 
the domestic production of oil and natural gas. 
The natural gas industry looks more promising.41 Natural gas reserves in Indonesia and 
Malaysia are plentiful and easy to exploit, while the scale of production is most abundant. With 
the huge production of natural gas, it is easy for these countries to meet their domestic demand, 
while in 2012, these two countries exported natural gas to the extent of 34.8 billion cubic meters 
and 30.3 billion cubic meters. In the last five years, the trade pattern has been stable.
Table 6: Proven natural gas reserves of 10 ASEAN countries (unit: trillion cubic feet)42
Nations 1993 2003 2012 2013 2013(Reserve and  
production ratio)
Brunei 14.0 13.8 13.8 13.8 23.6
Indonesia 64.0 93.0 141.0 108.0 41.6
Malaysia 68.0 75.0 83.0 83.0 15.8
Thailand 8.5 13.3 10.6 10.06 6.8
Vietnam 0.6 6.8 24.7 24.7 24.7
Cambodia 0 - - - -
Burma 9.8 10.0 10.0 10.0 21.6
Singapore 0 - - - -
Laos 0 - - - -
Philippines 1.6 3.8 3.48 3.48 -
Table 7: Natural gas production in the 10 ASEAN countries (unit: 10 billion cubic feet)43
Nations 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Brunei 334 349 417 439 426
Indonesia 2557 2841 2693 2559 2486
Malaysia 2133 2171 2180 2180 2440
Thailand 1090 1281 1306 1458 1476
Vietnam 250 290 272 296 346
Cambodia 0 - - - -
Burma 408 426 421 416 463
Singapore 0 - - - -
Laos 0 - - - -
Philippines 111 103 102 99 115
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Table 8: The 10 ASEAN countries’ natural gas consumption (unit: 10 billion cubic feet)44
Nations 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Brunei 88 105 107 107 110
Indonesia 1344 1397 1320 1329 1356
Malaysia 1100 1144 1081 1103 1200
Thailand 1383 1592 1645 1796 1854
Vietnam 250 290 272 296 346
Cambodia 0 - - - -
Burma 115 114 118 116 121
Singapore 285 295 310 331 370
Laos 0 - - - -
Philippines 111 103 102 99 120
The economic structure of ASEAN countries is relatively simple and unitary, and its 
economy has developed a high level of dependence on energy. For some of the countries, such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia, oil and natural gas resources are relatively plentiful, whereas in Vietnam, 
oil and natural gas production and exports account for the majority of the country’s developing 
economy. For Thailand, Philippines, and Burma, the oil and natural gas is not as plentiful as in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which means that energy has to be imported; otherwise, these 
countries will have to develop their own industries to meet their demand for energy. On the other 
hand, the development of a domestic oil and gas industry is the best way to boost the national 
economy. Burma’s proven natural gas reserves are quite abundant, which makes the exporting of 
natural gas a possibility and create potential for the national economy to grow rapidly. At present, 
some problems exist related to exploiting oil and natural gas, which include a lack of funding, 
complex geological conditions, and the overly high cost of mining. Thus, Burma is promoting 
the pace of energy cooperation with foreign enterprises to exploit oil and natural gas. ASEAN 
countries are trying their best to exploit energies to participate in the global economy.  
From 2011, some countries experienced political unrest, such as in the Middle East and 
North Africa, which has affected regional politics and the economy. At the same time, the rest of 
the world was becoming increasingly globalized. A direct effect of the unrest in the Middle East 
and in North Africa was the instability of oil and natural gas production, which led to fluctuations 
in the international price of oil and even led to a breaking off of the energy supply-chain all over 
the world. There was no doubt that the biggest risk of these events was experienced by China, 
which had imported crude oil from the Middle East and North Africa for a very long time.45 
In order to improve its national energy security, China has clearly attempted to strengthen its 
development strategy of oil and natural gas cooperation with Russia, Central Asian countries, 
ASEAN countries, and other neighboring countries. At present, the country imports oil from the 
ASEAN countries, and although the proportion has declined, the volume of natural gas imports 
has grown. The adjustment of the national energy strategy further increases the strategic 
position of the ASEAN countries. It also promotes the multiplication of energy sources and the 
maintenance of energy security.
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6.4 Cooperation Between China and ASEAN by Neo-Liberalism
Realists and neoliberals have dif ferent perspectives on what would have to change to 
increase cooperation in a particular situation.46 These differences can be understood by applying 
Robert Powell's distinction between preferences over strategies, or ways to reach goals, on the 
one hand, and changes in preferences over goals or outcomes, on the other47. Neoliberals are 
more optimistic than realists because they believe that changes in preferences over strategies 
usually are sufficient to produce mutual benefit. Much of this change can come by more and 
better information-information about the situation, information about what the other side has 
done and why it has done it, and information about what the other side is likely to do in the 
future48. States can cooperate by reducing transaction costs (the costs and risks associated with 
reaching and carrying out agreements) and, in turn, the successful reduction of such costs 
can facilitate cooperation. Institutions can play a large role here, and this helps explain why 
institutionalized cooperation can continue even when the initially propitious conditions have 
disappeared49. With what we had mentioned above, the cooperation between China and ASEAN is 
benefit for each other. In this process, China has clearly attempted to strengthen its development 
strategy of oil and natural gas cooperation, and adjusted the internal structure on energy to 
solve the problems on air pollution, meanwhile, the economic structure of ASEAN countries 
is relatively simple and unitary, and its economy has developed a high level of dependence on 
energy. Because the cooperation is benefit for bilateral, it probably will last for a long period.
7. The Challenges for China-ASEAN cooperation
Even though we have discussed the benefits of China-ASEAN energy cooperation from the 
viewpoint of neo-liberalism, the cooperation also faces some challenges: 
(1) Mutual trust in politics 
In terms of political exchange, mutual political trust is a prerequisite for China and the 
ASEAN countries, and this issue is currently one of the biggest obstacles to China-ASEAN 
energy cooperation.50 Oil and gas cooperation between China and ASEAN faces problems such as 
territorial controversy among the ASEAN countries; not only is it difficult to adjust international 
relations, security problems exist in the international community, and some of these problems 
are attributable to history. ASEAN countries hold different opinions about China’s development; 
some have said that China is a threat to ASEAN. These problems make it difficult for each 
country to practice oil and gas cooperation in the future. 
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(2) Internal contradictions among ASEAN countries
These contradictions in the ASEAN countries have lasted for a long time. As far as we 
can conclude, they take mainly three forms: 1) historical grievances and territorial sovereignty 
conflicts among ASEAN countries, which makes the relationships among ASEAN members 
volatile. During the 1970s and 1980s, Vietnam had invaded Cambodia, and although the current 
bilateral exchanges are frequent and vast. Disputes related to the sovereignty of islands have 
also taken place between Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, and Indonesia and 
Philippines, which reflects the difficultly of ASEAN cooperation as a whole. 2) It also a common 
phenomenon for members of ASEAN to experience degrees of political unrest, and domestic 
political parties can frequently be seen breaking out into partisan conflict. Burma has been 
dominated by the military for a long time, which leads to obvious social contradictions. In 
addition, terrorist incidents sometimes occur in the countries due to anti-government forces. 
When these forces become strong, disasters ensue for the country’s citizens. In recent years, the 
American war on terrorism has, to some extent, inflicted injuries on Islam and Muslims, not only 
the people but also the traditional culture, which has led to rising national emotion in the ASEAN 
countries. Because of the instability of the Political Bureau, foreign investment has been limited 
and unstable. Thus, international economic activities and trade are often disturbed, which is 
harmful to the region’s economic development and community and even to the formation of the 
free trade area. 3) There are great differences among the ASEAN countries, especially in terms 
of ethnicity and religion, and these can easily break out into cultural conflicts.
8. Conclusion
The construction and development of the Maritime Silk Road has extremely important 
strategic significance for economic and cultural exchanges between China and the rest of the 
world. Strengthening oil and gas cooperation between China and the ASEAN countries is an 
important part of the construction and development of the Maritime Silk Road. Oil and gas 
cooperation between China and ASEAN has a long history. At present, both sides share an 
interest in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea oil and gas channels. The construction 
of the China-ASEAN free trade area, the ASEAN countries’ oil and gas production decline, the 
rise in consumption, and the Chinese government’s emphasis on oil and gas cooperation with 
neighboring countries provide good opportunities for future of oil and gas cooperation on both 
sides. In order to promote oil and gas cooperation between China and ASEAN, it is necessary to 
take the following measures: maintaining close high-level exchanges between parties; expanding 
government co-operation; strengthening the construction of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area; 
increasing oil and gas investment in ASEAN countries; and continuing to explore new ways and 
mechanisms of oil and gas cooperation in the South China Sea. These represent an effective 
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method for China to solve the urgent demand on energy. 
However, these do not mean that the importance of the Strait of Malacca is decreasing. The 
Strait of Malacca is a sea-lane of enormous strategic importance. Its critical role as a global trade 
passageway is underscored by the fact that it facilitates a quarter of the world’s seaborne trade 
and a third of its crude oil transportation. The Strait of Malacca provides a critical passage that 
facilitates trade between the West and the East. It sits between the oil-producing regions of the 
Arabian Gulf and the huge consumer markets of Europe and South Asia, including the world’s 
most dynamic economies in the Far East, which includes China, the world’s most populous 
nation and now its second largest economy. The Strait of Malacca has played an immense role 
in shaping the history of the region and the world and will continue to command international 
attention due to its strategic location and importance to global trade and the littoral states’ socio-
economic wellbeing and strategic interests.  
Neoliberals are more optimistic on cooperation in this case than realists because they 
believe that changes in preferences over strategies usually are sufficient to produce mutual 
benefit. Much of this change can come by more and better information-information about the 
situation, information about what the other side has done and why it has done it, and information 
about what the other side is likely to do in the future. States can cooperate by reducing 
transaction costs (the costs and risks associated with reaching and carrying out agreements) 
and, in turn, the successful reduction of such costs can facilitate cooperation. Institutions can 
play a large role here, and this helps explain why institutionalized cooperation can continue even 
when the initially propitious conditions have disappeared.
The Strait of Malacca is one the largest business channels in the world. However, with 
the artificial threats that exist, no nation can unilaterally control all the variables involved, 
and every nation has a unique capacity and responsibility to help elaborate countermeasures 
to solve the problem of energy security. The prime methods for solving the energy-security 
problem include deepening energy innovation, heightening energy-use efficiency, attending 
to the international energy stock, and building up a steady international oil supply condition. 
These are the necessary activities that will safeguard energy security. East Asian countries, 
especially the Northeast Asian countries, mainly import energy from the Middle East, however, 
the transportation line is long and the situations are complex. For ensuring energy transportation 
security is an important issue that these countries facing. Under the new situation of this region, 
bilateral or multilateral regional cooperation have become an indispensable and important part 
of ensuring national energy security and economic security. Every country should develop the 
methods of transporting oil, strengthening its control over energy transport, and quickening the 
oil reserve construction. All of these are important methods for ensuring oil security. Organizing 
conferences among relative countries to enhance military defense and to protect countries’ 
overseas interests is also a necessary measure for ensuring nations’ energy safety, while a 
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multiple energy structure is the ultimate solution to energy security. Finally, multilateral security 
cooperation is necessary for the East Asian countries.
For China, the Strait of Malacca is an important energy and trade passageway and the only 
way for the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road to pass through Asia. Without the Strait of Malacca, 
the initiative will be impossible. Moreover, China is cooperating with ASEAN countries on many 
oil and natural gas projects. From another angle, this proves that the Strait of Malacca is non-
substitutable. However, China should pay more attention to the importance of the Strait, which 
can be compared to the nation’s lifeblood of energy. The Malacca Dilemma still cannot be solved, 
and to some extent, the Strait of Malacca has become more and more important for cooperative 
energy security. 
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